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The article empirically explores bank-speciﬁc, industry-speciﬁc and macroeconomic
determinants of the net interest margin (NIM) in the Serbian banking industry. The
baseline regression results suggest that banks with an above-average equity-to-asset
ratio tend to report higher NIMs. The chosen proxy for loan default risk also appears
statistically signiﬁcant, but contrary to what is suggested by theory, indicates that the
relation between default risk and the NIM is inverse. Amongst industry-speciﬁc
determinants, only the proxy for concentration appears signiﬁcant, as expected, and
carries the preﬁx envisaged. Despite its narrow focus, this article does not ignore
other possible determinants of the bank NIM. The type of bank ownership, as well
as size effects, are explored further in order to gain insights into the inﬂuence of
those variables on the NIM. The approach we follow does not include proxies for
such determinants, but rather involves testing differences in regression results for
banks that belong to different groups (proposed by Angbazo, 1997). Where size is
taken into account, results indicate that large banks are better able to insulate books
against interest rate risk by managing liabilities, while the superior performance of
foreign banks could be attributed to their conservative lending practices and better
access to foreign ﬁnance.
Keywords: net interest margin (NIM); transition banking; risk exposure; ownership
JEL classiﬁcations: G21, P34
1. Introduction
The net interest margin (NIM) is computed by comparing net interest income, which
put simply, is the difference between interest revenue and interest expense, with average
earning assets. It is in and of itself a measure of bank efﬁciency. A bank can reach its
target level of efﬁciency by following a number of strategies. One approach is to maxi-
mise the spread between loan and deposit rates. However, the potential for boosting efﬁ-
ciency following this strategy is constrained by the competitive efforts of other banks.
Bearing this in mind, it follows that the optimisation of the NIM is nothing other than
each bank’s partial response to market conditions. The NIM reﬂects both pricing policy
and the available mix of assets and liabilities. There is also mutual interdependence
between pricing policy and asset structure. A more aggressive asset structure should
lead to greater interest revenues. This is an immediate effect, which may gradually
weaken, and eventually, even turn into its opposite. Also well documented is an inverse
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relationship between the level of the loan rate and the average quality of the loan
portfolio, due either to a sorting effect or an incentive effect of the loan rate on loan
quality (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Therefore, this study covers a number of bank ﬁnancial
ratios that we see as able to reﬂect the effects of both pricing policy and asset/liability
management on the NIM.
This is a single-country study and explores variations across banks that operate in
the same single legal, regulatory and macroeconomic environment. The legal and regu-
latory framework for the Serbian banking industry was set at the beginning of the new
millennium and underwent little change in the following years.
Consolidations in the banking industry and new entries and closures have all had
some impact on the structure of the sector, but this has had more to do with shifts
between individual banks’ rankings than with meaningful changes to any concentration
ratios.
There are also possible macroeconomic determinants that affect the NIM. Among
the most frequently studied ones are changes in the intermediating role of banks, and
inﬂation. We take the bank-asset-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio as the proxy for
bank intermediation. This ratio started rising at the beginning of the period and kept up
the same pace almost until its end. The inﬂation rate has changed little with time, so
that we do not expect to see those variables impact the NIM substantially.
This article is structured as follows: the ﬁrst section provides a review of the litera-
ture on margin determinants, and proceeds to cover methodology, data-set, description
of variables, and descriptive statistics. In the remainder of the article we present baseline
empirical results and continue with a discussion on the effects of bank ownership and
size on differences between banks. The ﬁnal section summarises the main conclusions.
2. Review of literature on bank net interest margin determinants
The NIM is set by banks to cover all the risks and costs of intermediation. ‘Adequate
net interest margin should generate sufﬁcient income to increase the capital base as risk
exposure increases’ (Angbazo, 1997, p. 56). Therefore, many risk-related determinants
are expected to prove their explanatory power. Although the pioneering work done by
Ho and Saunders (1981) ignored all risks other than interest rate risk for the sake of
simplicity, further empirical research has proven the signiﬁcance of credit risk (Wong,
1997; Angbazo, 1997), liquidity risk, as well as leverage, for differences in the NIM
(Carbó & Rodríguez Fernández, 2007; Fungáčová & Poghosyan, 2011). The most recent
empirical studies of NIM determinants all experimented with a broader range of bank-
speciﬁc explanatory variables (operational costs, size, non-interest revenue) as well
industry-speciﬁc and macroeconomic determinants (for a recent and most complete
review see Chen & Liao, 2011). These studies explore both developed and developing
industries, with either a regional or a fully global focus.
The NIM reﬂects the pure operational efﬁciency of a bank and the competitive nat-
ure of the two traditional banking markets: the credit and the deposit markets. ‘For tra-
ditional banking, which reduces banking business to making loans funded with deposits,
net interest income appears to be “bread and butter”‘ (Sinkey, 2002, 119). However, for
banking industries that have become more involved in non-traditional (fee-generating)
activities, the NIM ceases to be a reliable indicator of overall bank proﬁtability. Rogers
and Sinkey (1999) stressed the fact that this was particularly the case with larger banks,
which have smaller NIMs, more diverse revenue sources and greater ability to reduce
risk. Lepetit et al. (2008) found a weak correlation between bank interest margins and
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loan default risk, assigning the regularity to cross-subsidisation of traditional and
fee-based services. This is due to banks driving business out of traditional intermedia-
tion by mispricing loans to boost the sales of other services, offsetting lower interest
income with higher fees. This is a retreat to more information-intensive lines of busi-
ness, or a refuge of last resort from ﬁerce competition from non-bank lenders. Similarly,
Carbó and Rodríguez Fernández (2007) examined the possible inﬂuence of
specialisation/diversiﬁcation on bank interest spreads and pointed out that revenue from
non-traditional business may offset the lower interest margin. The authors underline that
the effect is fully observed only if more sophisticated measures (Lerner index, price
mark-up over marginal costs) substitute for accounting measures (NIM). Though the
proposed inﬂuence of the degree of diversiﬁcation (of revenue sources and assets)
doubtlessly merits scrutiny, the measures available are rather deﬁcient. Some researchers
use the loan-to-asset ratio, or the share of fee income in total income, to represent differ-
ent levels of diversiﬁcation. In and of itself, diversiﬁcation reduces shocks to the NIM
arising from idiosyncratic risk. However, the proposed measures inherently ignore the
role of diversiﬁcation of the core (lending) business, which is more important for tradi-
tional banking, and concentrate only on diversiﬁcation into non-lending activity. More-
over, contemporary banking regulations directed at adequate loan loss provisioning is
tailored to catch not only idiosyncratic lending risk, but also concentration risk.
Fortunately, Serbian banking seems to be a suitable laboratory for testing bank
efﬁciency based solely on the NIM, because the non-traditional business arena is less
active than in most well-developed banking markets, or, to put it otherwise, banks do
not differ signiﬁcantly in the portfolios of products they offer their customers. For
instance, ﬁnancial derivatives have the greatest potential to change the risk proﬁle of
banks (see Angbazo, 1997), but the derivatives market is still at an early stage of
development, while traditional off-balance sheet substitutes for loans (credit lines,
guarantees, etc.) do not challenge a bank’s relative position built upon the bank’s share
in the (on-balance-sheet) loan market.
In papers addressing banking in transition, the NIM is often used to test the success
of overall transition efforts. For instance, Drakos (2003) found the NIM signiﬁcantly
decreased over time in transition for Central and Eastern European countries. The same
trend is underlined in Claeys and Vennet (2008), which found the NIM of Central and
Eastern European countries responsive to increases in efﬁciency induced by transition,
but slightly less susceptible to changing market structure.
The relationship between bank margins and industry-speciﬁc and macroeconomic
variables also appears to be informative. Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2003)
examined the inﬂuence of bank regulations, concentration, and institutional development
on bank margin across 72 countries, while controlling for bank-speciﬁc determinants
and cross-country differences in macroeconomic and ﬁnancial sector developments.
They found NIM positively related to inﬂation and tighter regulations on bank entry,
with the latter exerting its inﬂuence through industry concentration. Furthermore, differ-
ences in bank regulatory frameworks become insigniﬁcant when indicators of economic
freedom or protection of property rights are controlled for.
Contemporary econometric research on determinants of the NIM relies on different
methodology. Researchers most often opt for either of the multiple regression models,
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Generalised Least Squares (GLS). There are also dif-
ferences in the composition of the samples used. Some studies are multi-country ori-
ented, but there is also single-country research (Angbazo, 1997; Fungáčová &
Poghosyan, 2011; Maudos & Solís, 2009). Although the single-country framework often
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suffers from small-scale sample issues, and offers less scope for studying industry-
speciﬁc and macroeconomic determinants, it is beneﬁcial in a number of ways. It is not
critically susceptible to data inconsistency, differences in taxation policy, and various
price-setting peculiarities. López-Espinosa, Moreno, and Pérez de Cracia (2011) found
that the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards decreased the
explanatory power of standard accounting variables. If the date of introduction differs
across countries sampled, it may bias the estimation of the relation. Albertazzi and
Gambacorta (2010) stress that differences in corporate income tax rates must be taken
into account. However, the authors doubted that such variations in taxation policy could
explain cross-country differences in bank proﬁtability when banks are able to shift the
tax burden onto end-users. Some differences in loan cost structure also challenge the
robustness of the results. Although the differences remain persistent even amongst banks
in the same industry, they are deﬁnitely more signiﬁcant internationally: Brock and
Rojas Suarez (2000) have drawn attention to the practice, common amongst banks, of
increasing their revenues from loans by charging fees and commissions. Current report-
ing methodology excludes this income from the NIM, making multi-country studies less
viable.
Almost all the papers examined deal with the issue within a dealership model setting
(Ho & Sounders, 1981; Ho & Stoll, 1981; with extensions by Angbazo, 1997 and
Maudos & Fernández de Guevara, 2004) where banks are viewed as risk-averse dealers
that provide immediacy by assuming the inventory risk that comes from asynchronous
arrivals of funds buyers and sellers. The model belongs to the intellectual tradition of
market microstructure literature, known as ‘inventory models’ (O’Hara, 2004).
3. Research methodology and data set
We here follow mainstream literature and apply the intuition of the dealership model,
using the OLS approach to estimate the parameters of the models. We estimate regres-











where i,t indexes bank-year observation, i stands for the bank, and t stands for the
reporting year. NIMi,t is the NIM for bank i in period t, α is the ﬁxed effect intercept,
and ei;t stands for the regression residual (disturbances), or the i.i.d. error term. B is a
vector of bank-speciﬁc determinants, I is a vector of industry-speciﬁc determinants, and
M is a vector of macroeconomic explanatory variables where K is either 5 or 2 (fourth
speciﬁcation), while L and N are 2 (as per the number of variables included).
The data-set on bank-speciﬁc variables comes in its entirety from the BankScope
database (Bureau van Dijk). The data are ratios directly selected from the database or
recalculated from annual ﬁnancial statements that come from the same data source. The
data cover the majority of banks that operate in the Serbian market. The sample con-
tains data for 29 out of a total of 33 banks that operated at the end of 2010 and held
over 97% of the banking industry’s total assets. Two missing banks operate in the
territory of Kosovo (Dunav Bank of Zvecan and Jugobanka Jugbanka of Kosovska
Mitrovica), while no full data-set is available for the other two banks (Moskovska and
Credy Bank).
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The time horizon spans the period from 2003 to 2010. Many banks have not
operated that long, meaning that their series are somewhat shorter. Moreover, data on
chosen variables are not available for all years for some banks. The sample used was
formed by an unbalanced panel of data obtained from a maximum of 160 annual
(bank-year) observations corresponding to at most 29 commercial banks. Data on
industry-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables come from ofﬁcial local sources (see
Table A1).
4. Selection of explanatory variables
Our choice of explanatory variables has been signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by theoretical and
empirical contributions from a broad range of literature on bank efﬁciency determinants.
The choice of possible determinants inclines mostly to that of Angbazo (1997), which is
the most quoted study in this ﬁeld of research. However, since the reference paper is
mostly oriented towards bank-speciﬁc determinants, it is not a comprehensive evaluation
of all possible determinants, but rather covers those most amenable to measurement. We
deliver four baseline regressions. The ﬁrst regression model is a slightly changed repro-
duction of Angbazo’s model, but the other two regressions are signiﬁcantly extended,
with some new proxies added for the same types of risk.
The implicit assumption is that banks cope with the various types of risk simply by
pricing it – by setting the spread between loan and deposit rates wide enough to absorb
adverse consequences arising from risk exposure. Therefore, the spread between rates,
and consequently the NIM, are expected to mirror any type of risk that banks face. Sev-
eral types of risk are found to be the most important throughout banking literature:
default risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, and exchange rate risk.
There are a number of variables that a researcher can use in order to estimate the
quality of the asset portfolio in terms of default risk. Several items are usually available
from income statements, such as net charge-offs or loan loss provisions. The ﬁrst alter-
native was not available because of the lack of data, since Serbian banks do not report
on charge-offs. The second alternative, although the data available do not seriously con-
strain analysis, was ruled out because of inconsistency and the numerical nature of the
variable. The variable is extremely volatile, since it depends mostly on managerial
discretion. Moreover, this is the only variable that may be reported even in negative
ﬁgures. The frequency distribution of data on this variable was not normal, and, being
negative, is not suitable for normalising by taking logarithms using raw data. We there-
fore had to look for other measures. The loan loss reserve is a balance sheet item. The
amount of the reserves indicates how risky the loan portfolio is at the time of reporting.
The variable is signiﬁcantly less prone to management ‘window-dressing’ since manag-
ers have to reserve a share of the value of each asset according to rules imposed on
them by the regulator. It also does not reﬂect a bank’s ability to allow reserves because
the reserves are included into the balance sheet in the required amount. In the event that
a bank is unable to set aside a portion of the reserves required, it should report the miss-
ing amount as a contra item on its balance sheet. Thus, the default risk of the loan port-
folio is measured by the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans. Deﬂated by gross
loans, the loan loss reserve ratio indicates the relative contamination of the crucial bank
asset component, i.e. its loan portfolio.
Choosing the right indicator for ﬁnancial leverage is a straightforward task. If banks
hold equity signiﬁcantly above the level required under capital adequacy regulations,
the equity-to-asset ratio could also serve as a proxy for the degree of risk aversion
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(Maudos & Fernández de Guevara, 2004). The more equity a bank uses to ﬁnance
operations, the more risk averse it is assumed to be, and as such will quote a higher
interest rate spread. Some researchers (e.g. Kasman et al., 2010) offer ‘bankruptcy
treats’ as a plausible explanation for the opposite direction of inﬂuence, in the sense that
banks whose solvency is endangered shift to risky investment alternatives and increase
the accounting measures of performance.
By bank liquidity we take the ability of a bank to meet its ﬁnancial obligations as
they become due. Understood thus, liquidity is a concept that depends on adequate
liquid assets (liquidity reserves) and borrowing capacity. We appraise the extent to
which the actual level of liquid assets is adequate by comparing liquid assets with the
sum of deposits and short-term funds. The ratio largely ignores the inﬂuence of borrow-
ing capacity (conditional borrowing) on bank liquidity, since the Serbian interbank mar-
ket remains rather shallow, with an average turnover that lends it marginal importance
for bank liquidity management. Moreover, the central bank generally stays clear of
direct ﬁnancing of troubled banks. Of course, cross-border credit lines open for liquidity
support make it easier for some banks to meet their liquidity needs.
Exchange rate (or currency) risk can be hugely important for banks that operate in
an environment of widespread and pervasive ﬁnancial dollarization, both in the deposit
and the credit market. However, due to the restrictive inﬂuence of currency mismatch
regulations on overall balance-sheet exposure to this type of risk, banks’ net open posi-
tions in various currencies are rather negligible. However, while direct (balance-sheet)
exposure to currency risk can be avoided by matching the currency composition of
assets with that of liabilities, it does not mean that lending (indexing loans) in foreign
currency does not change a bank’s risk proﬁle. Currency risk tends to turn into default
risk. Fortunately, national provisioning and capital adequacy regulations recognise this
threat and charge banks with additional regulatory costs if they lend (or index) in for-
eign currencies. Therefore, any currency-induced default risk (so-called indirect expo-
sure) is captured with loan loss provisions and mirrored in the default risk proxy. This
is the reason why no measure of direct balance sheet exposure to currency risk enters
any econometric speciﬁcation.
Management quality, for the purpose of such an analysis, is often taken in a some-
what narrower sense than usual. Some researchers use the ratio of average earning
assets to total assets to represent the management’s capability for improving earning
potential. We here suggest another approach, more direct than the one outlined above.
We test the above ratio, but supplement it by also testing the cost-to-income ratio in dif-
ferent speciﬁcations. The cost-to-income ratio is widely used by banks and belongs to
the operating efﬁciency category. Despite its name, this ratio does not include the total
cost in the numerator, but rather includes only non-interest costs known as ‘overheads’
(mostly wages and ﬁxed asset depreciation), while excluding loan loss provisions, with
interest cost being deducted from the ratio denominator. Overheads are perceived as the
part of total cost that is the most controllable and the most responsive to management
actions. A bank will be more efﬁcient if it is able to cover overhead costs by net interest
income and other operating income, which make up the ratio denominator. Banks that
operate in Serbia differ substantially in their reported cost-to-income ratios. Cost-to-
income ratios ﬂuctuate in the range from 10% to 419%, probably reﬂecting the length
of a bank’s presence in the local market. Banks that set up their operations a few years
ago have not reached the level of activity (economy of scale) needed to fully cover
overheads. Some researchers (Maudos & Fernández de Guevara, 2004) used different
proxies to capture the inﬂuence of operation costs on the dependent variable, i.e. the
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quotient between operating expenses and total assets. The pure (operational) costs of
intermediation are expected to have a ‘positive’ effect on the NIM, since a bank covers
them by increasing the loan rate and/or decreasing the deposit rate.
The greatest challenge was choosing the right interest rate risk proxy. The re-pricing
(funding) gap is a method imposed on banks by the regulator. However, as with much
regulatory data, this information is not available to the public. Moreover, many banks
do not report regularly on the maturity composition of their books. Some of them report
on asset composition in great detail, while others report on the composition of their lia-
bilities; we were thus unable to recalculate the missing data.
We deliver two alternative proxies for interest rate risk. The ﬁrst is the absolute dif-
ference between short-term assets and short-term liabilities, divided by equity. Short-
term assets are taken to be the sum of liquid assets and loans maturing in one year.
Short-term funding is the sum of short-term deposits and short-term borrowings.
Because many banks do not report on the maturity composition of their assets and lia-
bilities, this data-set has the fewest observations. The second proxy is computed as the
ratio of the absolute difference between total earning assets and the sum of deposits and
short-term funding, and equity. Both ratios use the same denominator. The numerator
for the second ratio is the absolute difference between total earning assets and deposits
plus short-term funding. This is not a ﬂawless representation of the maturity mismatch,
since a signiﬁcant portion of earning assets matures inside the one-year horizon. None-
theless, it still captures the difference between the average maturities of assets and liabil-
ities, because, as opposed to loans and other earning assets, deposits are more sensitive
to interest rate changes regardless of their contractual maturity. Banks widely offer
depositors the ability to withdraw deposits before they mature.
Contrary to Angbazo (1997), who assumes that interest rate exposure comes solely
from long net open positions, we believe that both long and short open positions
matter. Regardless of how books stay unmatched in terms of residual maturity, the
mismatch will bring interest rate risk into the equation. As underlined in Saunders and
Schumacher (2000), in a slightly different analytical framework, the bank faces
reﬁnancing risk if longer-term assets are ﬁnanced with shorter-term deposits, while it is
exposed to reinvestment risk if the opposite is the case, with both risks being different
varieties of genuine interest rate risk. The bank would either have to go to the money
market and borrow the missing funds (in the ﬁrst case), or invest excess funds (in the
second case), but in both cases it has to do it at the prevailing market rates. In monetary
policy studies, a strongly held assumption is that the money market (and ofﬁcial) rate
drives the bank loan rate. This was the rationale behind introducing a proxy for market
interest rate variability into the set of regressors in some studies (Maudos & Fernández
de Guevara, 2004). However, elasticity, time lag, and heterogeneity across banks are a
matter of empirical tests. Some facts led us not to include this variable from our analy-
sis. Firstly, it is indicated (Gambacorta, 2008) that this pass-through effect depends on
various bank-speciﬁc indicators (equity-to-asset ratio, liquid-to-total-assets) that have
already been incorporated into the model. Secondly, this is a study on the NIM (rather
than on spread), which in and of itself includes the impact of all interest rates on bank
income. Thirdly, the possibly lagged inﬂuence makes it difﬁcult to assess the right
dynamic speciﬁcation.
The proxies chosen for interest rate risk take into account only balance sheet data.
Off-balance-sheet items are ignored here, but the potential for those items to blur the
whole picture is rather irrelevant because this line of business is still at an early stage of
development in Serbia.
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Financial theory suggests that some variables that describe the industry itself could
also be beneﬁcial in assessing bank efﬁciency and the NIM. Firstly, although competi-
tion alone does not mean improved performance, oligopolistic banking is likely to
undermine the efﬁciency of banks and the banking system (Clarke, Cull, & Shirley,
2005). Consequently, two more variables enter the explanatory variable set: the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index of concentration and the bank-asset-to-GDP ratio. This
approach to expressing industry competition is less straightforward than using indicators
tailored to capturing market power. Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) and
Maudos and Solís (2009) experimented with a more explicit proxy for the degree of
competition. They used the Lerner index of market power as the difference between
price and total marginal costs (taken as the sum of operating and ﬁnancial costs).
Two macroeconomic determinants also enter the set: annual rate of inﬂation (CPI)
and real GDP growth rate. The rationale for adding the ﬁrst variable is the so-called
Fisher equation. The equation states that nominal rates are adjusted for market expecta-
tions of future inﬂation, further inﬂuencing the spread between rates and the difference
between interest revenue and expenses.
The real GDP growth rate is expected to inﬂuence the NIM since it affects loan
demand, supply of deposits, as well as the loan default rate. Gambacorta and Albertazzi
(2009) examined the inﬂuence of a wide range of business cycle indicators on different
bank proﬁtability indicators, and found a strong and positive correlation between the
GDP growth rate and the interest rate spread that may be the result of both increased
loan demand and greater borrower creditworthiness. It is worth noting that the study
covers only developed area (the eurozone and Anglo-Saxon countries), and that the per-
iod covered ends with 2003. As such, it covers no single episode of rapidly deteriorat-
ing economic conditions that may support a different conclusion, i.e. that the response
of interest rates to economic conditions is asymmetrical. High economic activity is
expected to drive (loan) rates up, while unfavourable economic conditions often do not
drive them down. This could explain why macroeconomic and ﬁnancial development
indicators sometimes fail to prove any explanatory power (see Naceur & Omran, 2011).
5. Descriptive statistics and baseline empirical evidence
A closer look at the descriptive statistics (Table 1) indicates the high variability of many
bank-speciﬁc explanatory variables. We also see that the average NIM differs across the
ownership and size subsamples. Foreign-owned banks operate with the lowest margin.
These are followed by domestic privately-held banks, with domestic state-owned banks
coming last. The same rankings hold true in respect of default risk proxy and equity-to-
asset ratio. Foreign banks lend more conservatively and are less capitalised, meaning
that they lead in using ﬁnancial leverage to boost their proﬁtability.
Concerning the proposed regularity between bank size and the value of different
bank-speciﬁc indicators, we see that larger banks operate with the lowest margins, least
risky loan portfolios, and smallest shares of equity. The regularity also holds when com-
paring medium-sized and small banks. Large banks have greater potential to cover over-
heads, while the different equity-to-asset ratio may be responsible for the differences in
interest rate risk exposure, since equity is used to deﬂate the variable (see Table A1 for
the deﬁnition of variables).
Table 2 presents parameters estimated by multiple linear regressions of the NIM and a
chosen set of bank-speciﬁc, industry-speciﬁc, and macroeconomic variables. Depending
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on data availability for different explanatory variables, there are between 30 and 160
bank-year observations.
In Table 2 above we present regression results for four alternative econometric spec-
iﬁcations. When F statistics are used, the fourth speciﬁcation dominates all others, but
the third speciﬁcation appears superior according to the value of adjusted R2. The fourth
speciﬁcation is a four-variable proﬁle, while the remaining ones are nine-variable proﬁle
equations. The fourth speciﬁcation is derived from the third one by a simple reduction
of the set of explanatory variables to those proved statistically signiﬁcant. Since any
variable may appear signiﬁcant when subsamples are tested, despite being rejected when
testing the total sample, we use the third speciﬁcation for further analysis.
The chosen proxy for loan default risk is statistically signiﬁcant, but, contrary to
what theory suggests, it indicates an inverse relation between default risk and the NIM.
However, this ﬁnding does not come as a complete surprise. Some studies (Brock &
Rojas Suarez, 2000) also conﬁrmed that a similar default risk proxy is negatively associ-
ated with bank interest spread in developing countries, challenging the adequacy of loan
loss provisions. We can offer another explanation. As is known from theory (Fisher,
1933), changes in banks’ exposure to default risk coincide with credit cycles.
Table 2. Estimation multiple linear regression results for total sample.
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Intercept −0.284 −0.256 −0.029 0.024
(−0.546) (−2.958)*** (−0.351) (0.423)
Default risk 0.039 −0.051 −0.064 −0.053
(0.355) (−2.946)*** (−4.129)*** (−3.497)***
Capitalisation 0.159 0.213 0.217 0.222
(1.753)* (9.687)*** (11.115)*** (12.661)***
Liquidity 0.019 0.021 0.007 –
(0.600) (1.766)* (0.674) –
Management quality 1 −0.113 – −0.141 −0.137
(−2.221)** – (−6.486)*** (−6.964)***
Management quality 2 – −0.004 – –
– (−0.764) – –
Interest rate risk 1 −0.006 – – –
(−0.677) – – –
Interest rate risk 2 – 0.003 −0.001 –
– (0.863) (0.244) –
Concentration 0.045 0.041 0.029 0.019
(0.824) (3.011)*** (2.402)** (2.057)**
Bank intermediation 15.664 4.474 −2.237 –
(0.663) (1.884)* (−0.982) –
Inﬂation 0.011 −0.022 −0.001 –
(0.044) (−0.212) (−0.010) –
Growth 0.625 0.394 0.192 –
(1.089) (2.752)*** (1.474) –
R2 0.502 0.498 0.607 0.572
Adjusted R2 0.277 0.468 0.583 0.561
F 2.239 16.556 25.708 51.841
N 30 160 160 160
Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics.
*Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Source: Authors calculation.
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 143
Recessions will increase the default rate of businesses and households. However, their
effects on bank interest rates and NIM are less clear. At least for existing loan custom-
ers, if possible, banks will re-price existing loans as they become due or when they are
renegotiated. This will generate a positive relation between default risk and the NIM,
ceteris paribus. In turbulent times, however, a credit crunch is also a plausible scenario.
Loan rates may even be lower because of credit rationing, which prevents any further
increase in the loan rate. Those effects on the NIM come from the revenue side. To get
a complete picture, it is necessary to jointly address developments that come both from
the revenue and the expenditure side. Worsening credit conditions are expected to go
hand in hand with a rise in the cost of bank funds. However, contemporary credit
crunches have to date met with almost immediate responses of monetary authorities,
which decreased the cost of funds (EURIBOR, LIBOR). These developments have had
a modest net impact on regional banking groups that operate in Serbia, since the drops
in major international market rates coincided with credit outﬂow, which ultimately
increased the average cost of funds. Moreover, most banks have been isolated from for-
eign credit markets and rely exclusively on more expensive local (deposit) sources.
Even among foreign-owned banks, credit support from abroad is concentrated in the
few leading ones. Therefore, the increase in the average cost of ﬁnance has driven the
NIM down, generating the negative effect of default risk exposure to the NIM.
The baseline results suggest that banks with an above-average equity-to-asset ratio
tend to report higher NIMs. ‘Risk aversion’ is a plausible explanation. Nevertheless,
there is another obvious explanation for this regularity. Equity, as an alternative source
to debt, differs in that it requires no interest expenses, which makes the margin of bet-
ter-capitalised banks wider than the margin of their less capitalised competitors. How-
ever, this mode of saving on interest expenses should be mirrored by the lower return
on equity.
The liquidity risk proxy turned out to be inconclusive. A plausible explanation for
the ﬁnding is the fact that the regulator imposes the ratio. Banks must hold liquidity
reserves equal to the threshold set by the regulator, so that the ratio tends to be more or
less the same across all banks, unless some of them persistently hold excess liquidity
reserves, which is not systemically the case.
Contrary to the previous indicator, the ﬁrst proxy tested for management quality
appears signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. The ratio is actually an inverse means of
expressing a balance-sheet identity similar to the one we investigated using the liquidity
risk ratio. Except for newly established banks (which have a high share of investments
in ﬁxed assets), liquid assets and earning assets are by far the most important asset com-
ponents, and offset each other. This ratio may statistically rule out the signiﬁcance of
the previous one. As for the estimated preﬁx, it turned out that the fewer funds are
employed in earning assets, the higher the NIM. Fixed assets may also play a role, since
they are the third important component of the asset structure, apart from liquid and earn-
ing assets. If a bank holds proportionally greater investments in ﬁxed (non-earning)
assets, it might tend to structure its earning assets more aggressively to offset for
income ‘lost’ in ﬁxed assets. It may also indicate that the quality of earning assets plays
a greater role than their volume, and serves as a warning of the role of the liability
structure and cost of capital in determining the NIM.
The most signiﬁcant of all industry-speciﬁc and macroeconomic explanatory vari-
ables is the proxy for concentration (competition). It is statistically signiﬁcant in almost
all alternative speciﬁcations, and carries the predicted preﬁx. The industry concentration
ratio (HHI) becomes greater as the distribution of market share becomes less equal, or
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as industry becomes more concentrated (with the maximum set at 1). Therefore, the
positive preﬁx of the regression coefﬁcient indicates that an industry that is more
concentrated demands a higher NIM. The result holds true even if banking assets or
average bank size increase with time, so that improved scale efﬁciency might induce the
opposite effect. These elements are related to each other, since various sources of cost
inefﬁciency limit the role competition can play in passing the beneﬁts on to bank
customers, in the same manner as competition itself forces banks to improve efﬁciency.
Nevertheless, we could take it as a strong case in favour of the structure-conduct-perfor-
mance (SCP) hypothesis.
The explanatory power of the other three industry-speciﬁc and macroeconomic vari-
ables is rather weak, as suggested by inadequate t-statistics, p-values, and standard
errors (the last two not enclosed). In all regressions but one (the second one), the test
rejected the signiﬁcance of the variables.
6. Effects on inter-bank differences
In order to gain an insight into regularities that explain the variability of the NIM across
individual banks, we disaggregated data from the original sample into subsamples
according to two additional criteria: type of ownership and size. The approach employed
is alternative to one that ‘dummies out’ these categorical variables and uses them in
baseline regressions. This approach is in some ways superior, as it permits us to intro-
duce more than two classes of the same categorical variable. This section presents a test
of the third baseline econometric speciﬁcation (Table 3) on banks re-sampled ﬁrst
according to the type of ownership, and then according to asset size (Table 4). Those
two attributes of the banking industry’s structure are closely interconnected. In the last
decade, it was the entry of foreign capital that predominantly restructured the ownership
structure of the Serbian banking industry. Foreign competitors most often penetrated the
local market by acquiring either domestic privately or publicly owned banks. The same
force is responsible for changing both the ownership structure of the banking industry
and its level of consolidation. A sequence of takeovers gradually led to an increase in
the concentration of the banking industry and the predominance of foreign ownership.
In terms of the origin of foreign banking capital, the Serbian banking industry is largely
in line with more generally observed regularities (Van Horen, 2007). All foreign banks
came from neighbouring developed countries, while economic integration and geograph-
ical proximity played a signiﬁcant role.
6.1 Effects of bank ownership
Studying the effects of bank ownership on the efﬁciency of banks that operate in an
industry that has undergone privatisation and is faced with a constantly reshaping insti-
tutional environment is a challenging but nonetheless important task. Many banks that
operate in Serbia have changed their form of ownership with time (see Table A2),
which brings into focus an attempt to explore the potential importance of types of own-
ership for explaining bank performance.
The effect of bank ownership on various measures of bank efﬁciency has of late
become an extensively studied issue. In a paper that is now classic, Bonin, Hasan, and
Wachtel (2005b) conﬁrmed that foreign greenﬁeld banks were the most efﬁcient of all
bank types in six transition countries explored. These are followed by banks sold to
strategic foreign owners after being initially restructured. The study reported that
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state-owned banks are the least efﬁcient (concerning both cost and proﬁt efﬁciency).
Those foreign banks that entered local markets through takeovers of controlling shares
after privatisation operated more efﬁciently than foreign banks with dispersed ownership
did. They also tend to be more prudent and reluctant to lend in a weak environment
(Clarke, Cull, & Shirley, 2005, Yilmaz & Koyuncu, 2010). Some other studies came to
similar conclusions. Banks controlled by local industrial groups are often more exposed
to credit and interest rate risk (Boubakri, Cosset, Fischer, & Guedhami, 2005), but they
have the local advantage of access to fee generating business (Bonin, Hasan, & Wachtel,
2005a). Nevertheless, the effect of foreign ownership on bank efﬁciency is not always
assessed as positive. In a recent study (Lensink, Meesters, & Naaborg, 2008) that covers
a broad range of countries, foreign banks are found inferior in comparison to domestic
banks, with inferiority in the relative level of efﬁciency weakening along with the disap-
pearance of the gap between institutional development of the home and host countries.
Furthermore, studies on ownership effects on efﬁciency of banks operating in a devel-
oped environment (in the German market) contrast the results obtained for developing
and transition countries. Altunbas, Evans, and Molyneux (2001) found public banks
superior to their privately-owned counterparts, with all appearing to beneﬁt from econo-
mies of scale. Their superior efﬁciency holds true even when controlled for size differ-
ences, and is explained by the lower cost of ﬁnance.
Table 3. Estimation results by bank ownership.
Variable Foreign Domestic private Domestic public
Intercept −0.101 −0.016 −0.174
(−0.891) (−0.133) (−0.817)
Default risk −0.099 −0.135 −0.065
(−1.688)* (−3.177)*** (−2.675)**
Capitalisation 0.207 0.195 0.208
(7.029)*** (7.081)*** (3.888)***
Liquidity 0.008 0.039 −0.022
(0.552) (2.487)** (−1.011)
Management quality 1 −0.050 −0.118 −0.240
(−1.538) (−3.241)*** (−4.661)***
Interest rate risk 2 0.004 −0.008 −0.010
(1.239) (−1.233) (−1.058)
Concentration 0.024 0.017 0.072
(1.705)* (1.022) (2.209)**
Bank intermediation 1.925 3.020 −2.751
(0.462) (1.092) (−0.569)
Inﬂation 0.006 0.087 −0.233
(0.050) (0.719) (−0.993)
Growth 1.197 0.062 0.543
(1.183) (0.328) (1.736)*
R2 0.519 0.753 0.752
Adjusted R2 0.453 0.689 0.678
F 7.817 11.847 10.142
N 75 45 40
Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics.
*Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Source: Authors calculation.
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Privatisation alone transforms the efﬁciency of a banking system in transition, but it
strongly depends on whether the state will privatise better-performing banks ﬁrst and
hold its stake in loss-making ones, or vice versa (Bonin, Hasan, & Wachtel, 2005a).
Empirical ﬁndings suggest little optimism about the impact of privatisation on divested
banks (Megginson, 2005). Moreover, privatisation is expected to have positive effects
on bank performance, but these results will not even be close to those seen in non-
ﬁnancial industries. This implies that the relative efﬁciency of banks with different
forms of ownership will be country-speciﬁc, since the model of bank privatisation and
the sequence of steps will depend on national privatisation policy.
The ability of the form of ownership to explain the variability of the NIM across
banks has been studied extensively. Košak and Čok (2008) found that NIM was the best
discriminator (amongst the performance measures tested) between foreign-owned and
domestic banks in six South-Eastern European countries, but evidence of which form of
ownership performed better was rather mixed. Paghosyan (2010) found that foreign
bank participation had no relevant inﬂuence on the NIM in Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries. The impact remained insigniﬁcant even when proxies for foreign bank
market share and dummy variables for different type of foreign entry (greenﬁeld and
acquired foreign banks) were included. The ﬁndings may be explained by the fact that
the other variables tested already account for the main inﬂuences of foreign ownership
on the NIM. Chen and Liao (2011) followed a similar approach. They simply added the
Table 4. Estimation results by bank size.
Large Medium size Small
Intercept 0.144 −0.056 −0.087
(1.338) (−0.327) (−0.717)
Default risk −0.052 0.006 −0.076
(−2.454)** (0.112) (−3.928)***
Capitalisation 0.171 0.126 0.251
(7.885)*** (2.245)** (7.726)***
Liquidity −0.015 0.024 0.001
(−0.986) (1.036) (0.036)
Management quality 1 −0.132 −0.116 −0.160
(−3.435)*** (−2.426)** (−5.091)***
Interest rate risk 2 −0.003 0.021 −0.012
(−1.065) (2.802)*** (−2.246)**
Concentration 0.004 0.024 0.036
(0.306) (0.982) (2.007)*
Bank intermediation −3.700 0.040 2.208
(−1.152) (0.008) (0.665)
Inﬂation 0.058 0.059 0.033
(0.549) (0.321) (0.229)
Growth 0.040 0.105 0.288
(0.268) (0.405) (1.399)
R2 0.631 0.358 0.792
Adjusted R2 0.557 0.226 0.746
F 8.541 2.723 17.301
N 55 54 51
Figure in parenthesis are t-statistics.
*Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Source: Authors calculation.
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form of ownership (dummy) to the many other explanatory variables for different
measures of bank proﬁtability (among others the NIM). They found that foreign bank
proﬁtability crucially depends on differences between home and host country conditions
(competitiveness, supervision, etc.). Differences in ﬁnancial conditions among the vari-
ous forms of ownership can reﬂect different customer bases, procedures, and tax
regimes (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001). The only facts that favour
domestic banks are their local knowledge and existing customary base.
The ownership transformation of Serbian banks is a process that has now been
underway for some time. The above review indicates that inter-bank variations in NIM
may be related to differences in ownership. The ﬁrst step in examining them is to disag-
gregate the total sample into subsamples of foreign ownership, domestic private owner-
ship and domestic public ownership. Banks are divided into classes according to the
origin of their equity. If no type of owner controls over 50% of a bank’s equity, that
bank will be classiﬁed according to the origin of its major owner. Therefore, although
the Republic of Serbia rarely owns more than 50% of the equity of any one bank, it is
recorded as the major owner in several instances. The data-set comprises bank-year
observations: as the banking industry has seen rapid transformation over the last decade
in terms of ownership, the ownership structure at the end of the time span differs sub-
stantially from that at its beginning. In classifying banks into different groups according
to ownership, we examined the actual year when each bank changed its form of owner-
ship. Data on the year in which a bank moved into another class are provided in the
Appendix (Table A2). The years under a previous form of ownership were separated
from the years of new ownership according to the following rule: the ﬁrst year of new
ownership is taken to be the ﬁrst year after the year that the ownership transformation
actually took place.
6.2 Bank-size effects on the net interest margin
The consolidation of ﬁnancial service providers has recently become a global phenome-
non. In a theoretically oriented paper, Milbourn, Boot, and Thakor (1999) point out
some reasons why expanding the size of a bank may be seen as beneﬁcial to sharehold-
ers. The authors suggest that increasing size (and scope) may be the right strategic deci-
sion in an environment with sufﬁcient proﬁtability in current operations and substantial
uncertainty about the future core competences of a bank, but it may also be a result of
managers seeking to enhance their reputation. Nevertheless, theory tells us little about
the links between size and pricing policy, as well as NIM. The market microstructure
theory implies that, if the market (both deposit and credit) is competitive, banks that are
less aggressive in terms of their quoted interest rate spreads are expected to have the
lowest market share in both the deposit and the credit market. Bearing in mind that
overheads are largely ﬁxed, the less aggressive pricing policy will draw such banks out
of the market, which will ultimately cause a high cost-to-income ratio, restrict return on
assets, or even make ﬁnancial results negative. Therefore, the second attribute of a bank
that is taken to be important for explaining the variability of the NIM is bank size. If
the size of a bank is important for pricing policy and the degree of efﬁciency, it should
be apparent in variations of the NIM.
Total assets are the most widely accepted measure of bank size. The classiﬁcation of
banks according to differences in size appears to be less straightforward than according
to the previous attribute. Some researchers (e.g. Angbazo, 1997) start out with clear-cut
classes of banks that are used ofﬁcially for reporting purposes and analytics.
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Unfortunately, the national regulatory body does not recognise either this or any other
similar system of grouping banks. We were therefore free to arbitrarily choose the
boundaries for assigning a bank to one of the various size groups.
Again, size rankings happened to change frequently during the time span observed,
so that taking the ﬁnal or the starting rank of each bank to judge its relative size was
not a reliable method. As in the preceding cases, we initially started with the actual
ranking of each bank in each year. The classiﬁcation was simpliﬁed by disaggregating
the total sample into three subsamples, each containing a similar number of banks.
Thus, the classes are as follows: large, medium-sized and small, representing respec-
tively the upper, middle and lower third of the total number of banks that made up the
sample for each reporting year. This type of classiﬁcation proved to have the smallest
number of transitions among classes during the entire period. Neither class consists of
more than 15% of observations that do not belong to the assigned class consistently
through time. There were 10% of ‘transitions’ between classes in total during the entire
period. This form of classiﬁcation produced the following boundaries: all banks that
reported total assets in excess of 80 billion Serbian dinars in 2009 were placed into the
large-size group; banks holding total assets between 40 and 80 billion were assigned to
the medium-size group; while banks with total assets below 40 billion made up the
smaller-size group. Although there is some connection between size and type of owner-
ship, this is not so clear-cut. The majority of foreign-owned banks belong to the top tier,
but they appear in the next subsample only slightly more rarely. Therefore, the unclear
nature of the size-ownership relationship justiﬁes a separate analysis of the impact of
size and ownership impact on NIM. If size does have any effect on NIM, it may indi-
cate differences in pricing policy and the structure of assets and liabilities. Leading for-
eign-owned banks raise ﬁnance by borrowing directly from other group members
abroad at a cost that regularly stays below the price of domestic sources. Those differ-
ence in liability structure may be responsible for the narrower NIM and generate both
size and ownership effects.
Disaggregation of the total sample resulted in some changes in the signiﬁcance of
the explanatory variables. Default risk is more important for domestic private banks than
for the foreign ones, which conﬁrms the assumption that foreign banks apply more con-
servative lending practices. The management quality proxy (earning assets to total
assets) appears signiﬁcant, and remains so when banks are sorted by either ownership
or size. The inverse relation between the share of earning assets and the NIM may indi-
cate that the quality of earning assets plays a greater role than their volume, and warns
us of the role of liability structure and cost of capital in determining the NIM. For large
banks, the interest rate risk proxy remains outside the relevant explanatory variables, as
opposed to the other two groups, probably because the largest banks are better able to
hedge against it.
The importance of industry concentration deserves special scrutiny. In the study
mentioned above, Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) found that the num-
ber of entrants matters more than their market share. The same is true of the Serbian
banking industry. Since 2006, when an increasing number of foreign banks began oper-
ating, the NIM started to decrease. The trend was broken only in the turbulent year of
2008, when a twin crisis hit the local banking market. This ﬁnding underlines the very
nature of the competitive structure of banking markets. If product lines are very much
the same across all banks, or if we have a conditionally homogeneous product, new
entrants can act as a serious treat to their rivals already present in the market. It
becomes easy for late entrants to catch up with the early ones if there is no hidden
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reason for a customer to stay with a bank that charges more for the same service.
Although we emphasised that the transition between size groups in time was rare,
changes in ranking inside size groups were nonetheless apparent.
However, the mobility of bank customers is limited since banks regularly charge
their customers special fees if they attempt to switch to another bank (e.g. costly pre-
payment options), and thus effectively segment the market. This explains why less efﬁ-
cient competitors were able to keep their presence in the market, and even to increase
their assets. This effect is coupled with the well-known interdependence of price and
quality (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Different banks, quoting different prices, will serve dif-
ferent ranges of customers. Top-quality customers make up the client base of the most
efﬁcient banks while others are forced to seek elsewhere, so that cutthroat competition
is not something one sees in banking markets.
7. Conclusion
Baseline regression results show that various risk-related determinants (e.g. default risk
proxy, leverage) are alone able to explain a signiﬁcant portion of NIM variability. We
take it as proof that pricing policy largely takes into account risk exposure. The reported
statistical insigniﬁcance of different interest rate proxies may indicate that average banks
are well insulated against interest rate risk. Risk exposure captures prospective losses or
effective costs. There are also different types of operational costs that have to be cov-
ered by NIM. The statistical insigniﬁcance of the cost-to-income ratio rejects the
assumption that banks burdened with overheads can escape the adverse impact on prof-
itability simply by passing these costs on to their customers. The competition is plausi-
bly the force that limits the ultimate effects of such efforts. The cost-to-income ratio
may prove to have greater explanatory power in a multi-country study, since banks
often enjoy some level of protection from outside competitors as long as they remain
inside national boundaries. If each country differs in terms of the level of bank competi-
tion, different amounts of costs will be able to be passed on to end-users.
We should exercise some caution when using this analysis to gain insight into bank
pricing policies. The overall potential of NIM variability to explain cross-bank differ-
ences in pricing policy is not as strong. Although the spread between the loan rate and
the deposit rate is captured in the NIM, it tells us nothing of whether the spread is
equally centred. The same spread might be reached by setting both rates at levels below
those set by competitors, above them, or uniformly for all banks. Market microstructure
literature tells us that an intermediary does not have to be equally aggressive in pursuing
its interests on both sides of the banking market, i.e. when raising or employing ﬁnance.
We have already noted that foreign banks that borrow substantially from their parent
groups – and that are at the same time industry leaders – are not ruthless in competing
with domestic-owned banks for domestic sources. Nevertheless, cheap foreign funds
make it possible for them to set loan rates competitively, capture market share, and
attract top-quality borrowers. This may explain why the NIM of medium-sized banks is
less responsive to their default risk exposure. Less efﬁcient competitors may have to
‘follow the leader’ in quoting their rates. This makes individual risk exposure less
important in a price setting, and challenges its relevance as a NIM determinant. How-
ever, a great deal of issues remain unsolved, and this justiﬁes further research using a
different approach appropriate for a separate analysis of credit and deposit market
mechanics.
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Appendix
Table A1. Variable deﬁnition and sources.
Variable Deﬁnition Data source
NIM Interest income minus interest expenses divided by
average earning assets
BankScope
Default risk Ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans BankScope
Capitalization Ratio of book equity to total assets BankScope
Liquidity Ratio of liquid assets to sum of deposits and
short-term funding
BankScope
Management quality 1 Ratio of earning assets to total assets BankScope
Management quality 2 Cost to income ratio BankScope
Interest rate risk 1 Difference between short term assets and short term
funding divided by equity
BankScope
Interest rate risk 2 Earning assets minus sum of deposits and short-term
funding, divided by equity
BankScope
Concentration Herﬁndhal-Hirschman index of concentration (assets) National bank
of Serbia
Inﬂation Annual consumer price index Statistical
Bureau




Growth Real GDP rate of change Statistical
Bureau
Source: Authors calculation.
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Table A2. List of banks entering the sample and ownership status.
Bank name
Initial status Change of status
In the form Covered from Into Starting at
BancaIntesa DPR 2002 FO 2006
Komericijalna banka DPU 2008 – –
Raiffeisen bank FO 2002 – –
EFG bank FO 2005 – –
Hypo Alpe Adria FO 2003 – –
AIK banka DPR 2002 – –
Societe Generale bank FO 2003 – –
Unicredit FO 2004 – –
Vojvođanska banka DPU 2003 FO 2007
Alpha banka FO 2008 – –
Procredit FO 2002 – –
Volksbanka FO 2005 – –
Erste banka DPU 2002 FO 2006
OTP FO 2006 – –
Pireaus banka DPR 2002 FO 2006
NLB banka DPR 2004 FO 2008
Agrobanka DPR 2003 – –
Credi Agricole DPR 2005 FO 2006
Univerzal banka DPR 2005 – –
Razvojna banka Vojvodine DPU 2003 – –
Poštanska štedionica banka DPU 2004 – –
Marﬁn banka DPR 2004 FO 2007
Čačanska banka DPU 2003 DPR 2006
KBC banka DPR 2005 FO 2008
Findomestic DPR 2004 – –
Srpska banka DPU 2002 – –
Opportunity banka FO 2006 – –
Privredna banka Beograd DPU 2004 – –
Jubmes DPU 2002 – –
Legend: FO – foreign owned; DPR – domestic privately owned; DPU – domestic publicly owned.
Note: Banks are listed according to their size at the end of 2009.
Source: Authors calculation.
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